University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
International Grassland Congress Proceedings

XIX International Grassland Congress

Transforming Science into Practice
Janice Jiggins
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Sweden

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/igc
Part of the Plant Sciences Commons, and the Soil Science Commons

This document is available at https://uknowledge.uky.edu/igc/19/33/11
The XIX International Grassland Congress took place in São Pedro, São Paulo, Brazil from
February 11 through February 21, 2001.
Proceedings published by Fundacao de Estudos Agrarios Luiz de Queiroz
This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Plant and Soil Sciences at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Grassland Congress Proceedings by an authorized administrator of
UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

TRANSFORMING SCIENCE INTO PRACTICE
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Abstract

The space for action that might move agricultural systems toward sustainability is
narrowing. In so far as increasing dis-order in agroecosystems and food systems is caused by
human agency, then remedial action must take account of cognition. This article argues that
an understanding of cognitive processes is essential, as the foundation for participatory R, D
& E that builds platforms of cooperation, binding actors into communities of learning that are
trasnforming both science and practice.
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A new framework of understanding
As I write this, I am considering some sobering facts:
•
for the first time in around 50 million years, the Arctic ice cap is melting, and a sea
passage opened up in the summer of 2000. Some already are hailing the possibility of cutting
the time and cost, and increasing the volume, of trade over the north polar sea route. That is,
the effects of the production and consumption that are triggering profound changes in global
ecosystem structures and functions, are seen by some simply as opportunities for further
expansion of the drivers of ecological change.
•
The global agrochemical market was valued at US $ 30 billion in 1995 (Ragnarsdottir,
2000). Competitive restructuring has since reduced the main players to a handful of
corporations (Jiggins et al. 2000). Approximately 100,000 chemicals are marketed for use
within the European Union alone. For 2000 to 3000 of the large volume chemicals on the EU
market, insufficient toxicity and eco-toxicity data are available for 75 % of them for
‘minimal’ risk assessment under OECD guidelines (EEA/UNEP 1998). Organophosphates
comprise a large part of this market; they have been sold as safe for use on crops and animals
due to their relatively fast degradation rates. But the evidence is that they can and do persist in
the environment years after their application, when conditions are unavailable for microbial
metabolism, and that they are preserved and transferred to humans through food
(Ragnarsdottir, op.cit). OPs are highly toxic and human exposure is undesirable (ibid). A
volume estimated as at least one billion litres a year of a chemical cocktail comprising OPs,
solvents, bactericides, and emulsifiers, are poured onto UK farmland alone from sheep dips.
And yet, the agrochemcial corporations, repositioned as ‘life science’ companies, have
attempt to launch genetically engineered crops and pasture plants onto the market on the back
of herbicide and pesticide resistance.
There are many more examples of this ‘business as usual’ and ‘more of the same’
mentality, and of the failure of market signals to guide people toward behaviour that is
ecologically rational. The latest compilation of the consequences can be found in World

Resources 2000-2001: People and Ecosystems, the Fraying Web of Life (UNDP, UNEP,
World Bank, World Resources Institute, 2000).
Science does not stand apart from this collective failure. Jane Lubchenco, as President
of the American Academy of Science, recognised in 1998 that science had to enter a new
contract with society in order to deal with what she called the ‘eco-challenge’. Yet her
description of how this challenge was to be met was curiously weak: more scientific
knowledge, more data, better communication of the results of science to the public. Just as
economic theory, effectuated through the creation of economic institutions, has been
elaborated to deal with scarcity (though patently failing to do so for the majority of the
world’s population), the generation of modern scientific knowledge has received funding and
institutional support in order to increase our instrumental control over the causal relations of
the biophysical world (though by patently failing to perceive the systemicity of living
systems, control is just what we are losing).
In my view, both economic and scientific practice are leading us greatly astray, and
will continue to do so, in so far as they both fail to recognise the centrality of people as
cognitive agents. Cognitive theory today draws on empirical investigation in the biological
and the neurosciences rather than purely philosophical study. It offers a new way of thinking
about our role in changing our domain of existence, and how we might escape from the
predicament we ourselves have created.
The Santiago School of Cognition, developed by two Chilean biologists, Humberto
Maturana and Francesco Varela, offers a description of cognitive systems that I have found
helpful. It can can be presented as in Figure 1.
Their starting point was the question: how do organisms perceive ? They researched
the frog looking at a fly. They found that the image of the fly can not be projected onto the
nervous system of the frog; the physical processes governing the image of the fly (light
waves) are different to the neurological processes that produce the image created in the
central nervous system of the frog. They came to understand that in all living organisms, the
central nervous system is informationally closed with respect to its environment. All
perceptions of reality are perceptions constructed by the perceiver. But perceptions are not
arbitrary creations. The presence of the fly triggers change in the perceiving organism (the
frog tries to catch the fly), just as the action of the frog triggers changes in its domain of
existence (the fly tries to escape). Organisms and their environment are structurally coupled,
maintaining their relationships through mutual perturbation.

They further specify that ‘emotion’ is not the same as ‘intentionality’, nor does
intentionality imply some a priori setting of an objective to be attained, that motivates action.
Emotion is understood as the outwardly directed and public reaction to an inducer, that serves
in ensemble with the endocrine, immune and nervous sytems, to coordinate and largely
automate the physiological reactions required to maintain steady internal states in a living
organism (Damassio, 2000). In brief, emotion contributes to homeostasis in living organisms
and as such, is integral to the processes of reasoning and decision-making (ibid: 41). (Note
that this is not to say that emotions determine reasoning, rather that reasoning is clearly
impaired when an organism’s ability to be conscious of its own emotions is broken, and that
“certain levels of emotion processing point to the decision-making space where our reason
can operate most efficiently” (ibid:41).
The maintainance of structural invariance (the singular individual bounded by a body
over changing time and circumstance), and the continuity of reference that the
autobiographical self perceives, occur despite the constant death and renewal of all bodily
tissues except neurons (which none the less are modifiable by experience and learning), the

lens, and the heart muscle. Maturana and Varela name the capacity of living organisms to
self-organise, ‘autopoesis’. A living organism survives by continuously regulating and
renewing its internal processes such that structural coupling is maintained between the
organism and its environment, at the same time as preserving continuity and stability of
structure and function in the face of perturbation.
Homeostasis (or better, perhaps, to use Steven Rose’s term, homeodynamics), in
living organisms thus requires :
• sensors, a capacity to perceive imbalance between the perceiving organism and its
environment, and in the internal state of its own embodied systems;
• a capacity to act, the means to perform pre-emptive or corrective actions; and
• a disposition for action, including memory, emotion, experience, learning, as well as
innate genetic dispositions.
In simple organisms, these capacities are pre-set. In complex organisms , there is in
addition selection among numerous available responses, the construction of novel
combinations of response, the ability to plan ahead to avoid disadvantageous situations and
propitiate favourable ones, and learning from experience. In human beings, we extend these
capabilities further, by:
• Building additional sensors to monitor internal states and external signals from our
environment. (Note that even if we draw from memory, memories necessarily incorporate
triggers from both internal and external perturbations because these are co-registered in
memory formation);
• Generating images that are capable of depicting internal states, as well as images of
entities, actions, and relationships in our environment;
• Languaging, or processes of communicating through conversations .
Together, these extensions allow us to share meanings and hence create collective
understanding.
This is all the more remarkable since triggered response is necessarily something that
occurs ‘in the moment’. The brain reconstructs a sense of self, and perceptions of self in
relation to an environment, moment by moment, and always necessarily from the point of
view of the perceiver. We cannot therefore share a common experience although we may
enjoy an experience in common. The experiential perspective (which is the only one we have
available to us), as Damassio notes (op.cit:145), helps us to situate real objects. It also helps
us to situate ideas, regardless of whether they are concrete or abstract , and is “ a rich source
of metaphor in organisms endowed with such rich cognitive capacities as abundant
conventional memory, working memory, language, and the manipulative capacities we
subsume by the term intelligence” (ibid: 145).
Similarly, learning occurs in the continuous present and is necessarily adaptive. What
is learned may be stored in memory, but also in cultural norms, and in institutions, both
shaping and being shaped by further mutual triggering. These extensions of memory into
social interactions also embody co-registered perceptions of internal states and external
relationships. They cannot be reduced to the individual agent: “For better or for worse,
individuals really do share their thoughts and they do to some extent harmonise their
preferences, and they have no other way to make the big decisions except within the scope of
the institutions they build” (Douglas, 1986: 128). Just as there is no human being that exists
outside of social institutions, and thus no one can escape the shaping that each person’s social
‘domain of existence’ gives rise to, so too is a society’s system of knowledge, made visible in
social relations and institutions, the foundation of social order (Douglas 1996; Jiggins and
Roling 2000).

In summary of this dicussion, I draw attention to Maturana’s and Varela’s startling and
powerful definition of knowledge as effective action in the domain of existence. But what is
knowledge, what is effective action, in a domain of existence characteristed by anthropogenic
destruction of the very conditions necessary for our own existence ?
We have come full circle. If the institutions we build, if the social and economic
relations we privilege, and the science practice that we follow set up a strucural relationship
between ourselves and our environment that makes it ‘normal’ to perceive, act, and behave in
ways that bring into being an environment in which we cannot survive, that makes autopoesis
impossible, that damages and then destroys structural coupling with our domain of existence,
then we shall perish.
For me, transforming science into practice offers a chance to make a modest
contribution toward survival. It means that Research , Development and Extension (R,D&E)
must evolve knowledge and actions defined as (Roling, 2000):
• Knowledge that allows us to reflexively manage the cognitive system itself: When
structural coupling can no longer easily be sustained, people as cognitive agents (and
perhaps other cognitive agents to some degree) have a capacity through languaging and
metaphor, cultural expression, and their institutions, to re-configure the relationship, by
changing the meaning of their domain of existence and how to understand and act in it.
• Action that allows our perceptions and behavioural dispositions to maintain structural
coupling.
Examples
Case 1: Dairy Farmers in the Netherlands in Transition to More Efficient Nutrient Use (van
Bruchem et al., 1999a, 1999b).
Key features: inter-active R&D with approx. 90 Friesian dairy farmers, organised in
two cooperatives, based on premise that techanical research alone, carreid out under
controlled conditions, cannot provide integral solutions for sustainability in managed pastures
and dairying. Specifically, the reseachers and famers initially sought to improve manure
quality and reduce nutrient emissions to the environment.
A prototype farm was selected for each cooperative, providing contrasting ecological
and farming system profiles. Quantitative and qualitative data were recorded for each
prototype farm, and successively monitored as successive adjustements were introduced, with
the results shared at periodic within-co-op and between-co-op member meetings. The
adjustments were based on joint nutrient flow and transport analysis; the researchers then
proposed possible actions; the experimental designs were selected through dialogue, and the
assessment of the results was conducted through systematic participatory interaction.
An important learning that is emerging from the research is a focus on the concept of
regenerative capacity, linked to increases in enthalpy (order) and self-regulation at the system
levels important for sustaining agro-ecosystems (see also Defoer and Budelman, 2000).
Recent advances in biophysics and the measurement of energy flows, suggests that it might
soon be possible to connect organic farmers’ intuitive understanding of the regenerative
healthy ecosystems with hitherto neglected biological regulation mechanisms.
Case 2: Ranch Improvement Clubs, Montana (Matheson, N. 1995. Research by Farm and
Ranch Improvement Clubs, Sidebar 10.1, in Bird, E. A. R. et al. Eds. 1995.Planting the
Future. Developing an agriculture that sustains land and communityAmes, Iowa. Iowa
Unviersity Press, pp 183-185).
Key features of the Clubs:
• Producer groups, common practical problem

•
•

Local technical adviser
Small grants (up to $1000, from an NGO, AERO)

An example: Lower People’s Creek Cooperative (Fort Beiknap Reservation):
Objectives: to reduce use by the Bureau of Indian Affairs of herbicide to control leafy
spurge on grassland, and to try a biocontrol (sheep). The Cooeprative members were
concerned both with the sustainability of their community and with what they perceived as
‘poisoning’ of their land and water. The proposed experiment, of intensive grazing by 1,500
sheep on 70,000 acres (winter 1992), was jointly defined by the members and researchers at
Montan State University.
The results were monitored, and the effects jointly evaluated, by Club members and
Montana State University researcher). Specific results included :
• herd increased to 2,3000, to control spurge on more land;
a lamb enterprise started
• sheep biocontrol recognised as effecvive; BIA reduced herbicide use;
money saved by BIA used on fencing for tribal members who wanted to
control spurge with sheep.
Case 3: Group Farm Monitoring, New Zealand
(Sheath, G.W. and R.W. Webby, 2000.The results and success factors of a farm monitoring
and study group approach to collective learning, in LEARN@Paris, eds. Cow Up a Tree,
Paris, INRA Editions. In press).
Key features of the Group Farm Monitoring programme were:
• Groups of farmers (15-30 members)
• Participation of consultants, scientists, vets, service sector specialists (including banks)
• Selection of a central monitor farm, monitoring over 3-5 years
• Intensive biological and financial monitoring, presented and discussed at group meetings
every 3 months
• Simulation modelling to investigate alternative outcomes
• Adoption of action decisions, the monitor farmer retaining the right to accept or reject
group recommendations.
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Roll-on effects:
Other members began own monitoring
Transformation of the groups to ‘study groups’ focussing on topics (e.g. pasture quality,
young animal growth rates, family survival etc)
Performance outcomes (one study club):
All farms increased income (from 13 % to 31 %)
All but two experienced a 30% increase in kg. of meat produced per cattle stock unit
Farm expenditure remained level
Farm profit improved, all farms
Monitor farms adopted key innovations to farming system
All farms made strategy and practice changes, typically following sequence of: improving
effective usage of feed already grown; correcting soil nutrient deficiency/tactical use of
nitrogen; improving pasture composition and quality.
Analysis and Discussion

We may note the following commonalities (King, 2000):
• An emphasis on monitoring, by members of “ communities of practice” (LEARN@Paris,
2000),
• Facilitated through action researching, action learning (Roling and Wagemakers, 1997),
• That enables the members to become “communities of learning” (LEARN@Paris, 2000),
• Through critical enquiry into the assumptions informing their language and interpretations
(McClintock et al., 1997),
• And the use of systematic, participatory methods and techniques (Collinson, 2000).
Second order R&D is a label developed by Ray Ison and David Russell (2000) to
formulate science and science practice as a human activity that is aware of its own
assumptions and the relationships it forms in its domain of existence. Second order R&D has
the following features:
•
•
•

As science, it is:
Grounded in the explanation of what is experienced
Bringing forth a reality on the understanding that what is perceived, and the cognitive
agent, are a duality operating at different logical levels, such that one emerges from and
complements the other, and together forming a unity (such as a predator/prey relationship)
Involving the nature and study of relationships.

•
•
•
•

As professional practice, it is:
Motivated by invitation and enthusiasm
With all participants sharing responsibility for outcomes
Oriented to collective and individual learning
Using systematic methods and creating relationships that maintain dialogue or the
unfolding of meaning through conversation.

•
•

As a way of organising research, it is:
Building systemic interaction
Creating new affilitations.

The examples sketched in section 2, and indeed in Ison’s and Russell’s own account,
all draw attention to the energy that is sparked among participants in second order processes,
energy perhaps sufficient to change the direction we are otherwise heading. I emphasise this
point, for the evidence that things getting worse is accumulating, can be overwhelming, and
often is de-motivating (see, for example, UNDP,UNEP, World Bank, WRI 2000). As I have
noted, the trend data often lead simply to calls for ‘better communication of the results of
science to the public’ (Lubchenco,1999) and more efficient ways of doing the wrong thing.
The literature recognises the personal acts of courage that are demanded as the
pioneers set out on a new track (Meyerson and Scully, 1995). Four strategies that occur at the
interface of the individual and the organisation of second order R&D, and that seem to be
helpful are:
A. pushing change within the system as it is, through :
• small wins, by action that is considered credible and relevant by the system,
• local spontaneous authentic actions that extend the threshold of what is tolerated and
rewarded within the system
B. creating systemic change through:

•
•

languaging - redefining metaphor and concepts that express a new purpose, a new
meaning for who we are as researchers, and what we are about in communities of practice
and communities of learning,
maintaining meaningful affiliations and creating new affiliations, that sustain and nurture and may eventually lead to new organisational relationships and new institutions.
Conclusions

I argue for, and analyses case material that supports, the emerging practice of
interactive R,D&E. The weight of the evidence is that interactive R,D & E will emerge more
and more strongly as a mainstream practice, in the face of changing markets, institutional
arrangements and actors, and agro-ecological trends. Specifically, the evidence is that while
reductionist science remains important, it will increasingly be complemented by ‘second order
R & D’ that involves wider networks of actors, at a range of sysem levels, in interactive
relationships that are trasnforming both science and farming practice.
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Figure 1 - The Cognitive Triangle (after Maturana and Varela, 1992; Capra 1996)

